TFL Vsebine / Revija Revus

In Coercion and the Nature of Law (CNL), Kenneth Einar Himma defends his Coercion Thesis, which states: the authorisation of coercive enforcement mechanisms is a conceptually necessary feature of law qua legal system. In this discussion, I engage with Himma’s writings on legal normativity, on which he relies to support his Coercion Thesis. The conclusions in CNL regarding legal normativity are established in Himma’s earlier writings where he defends what I call the Strong Normativity Thesis. This thesis claims that legally valid norms necessarily provide their subjects with objective reasons for action. It stands in contradiction to what I call the Weak Normativity Thesis, which maintains that legally valid norms claim to provide their subjects with objective reasons for action. Himma’s account of legal normativity may support his Coercion Thesis, but, as I will argue, it should not be wholly embraced. I will first give a brief account of the claims that ground Himma’s Coercion Thesis. Then I will unpack Himma’s account of legal normativity and explain how it supports his Coercion Thesis. I will finally explain why I am hesitant to accept Himma’s account of legal normativity.