TFL Vsebine / Revija Javna uprava

Prispevek v uvodu ugotavlja, da se od podobnega konflikta pred 12 leti znanje o takih konfliktih pri nas ni prav nič izboljšalo; pod 2 povzame dosedanje poskuse teoretične analize takih vprašanj pri nas; pod 3 ugotavlja, da strokovne antiteze njegovi tezi, izpeljani iz nemške in ameriške literature (da parlament lahko sprejme zakon tudi v nasprotju z mnenjem ustavnega sodišča), doslej sploh še nihče ni podal, in zato nato pod 4 poda še dodatno argumentacijo te teze: pod 4.1 s prikazom razlik med dosedanjimi takimi konflikti v Nemčiji in v Sloveniji, pod 4.2 pa s prikazom novejših stališč nemške ustavnopravne znanosti o tej temi (pod 4.2.1 z gledišča delitve oblasti, pod 4.2.2 z gledišča Grundrechtsdogmatik). Končno pod 5 obravnava še vprašanje, ali je parlament sploh sposoben za interpretacijo ustave pri zakonodaji – z odgovorom, da mora biti, ker je interpretacija ustave, zavedna ali nezavedna, zakonodaji inherentna.

This contribution states in the introduction that from similar conflict 12 years ago our knowledge about such conflicts was not improved; in Section 2 the attempts of theoretical analysis so far in Slovenia are resumed; in Section 3 it is stated that un antithesis to his thesis, taken from German and American literature (that Parliament could adopt a law also in contradiction with the judgment of the Constitutional court), was not yet been presented; in Section 4 an additional argumentation for this thesis is presented: under 4.1 the differencies between such conflicts in Germany and in Slovenia are shown, under 4.2 the newer achievements of German constitutional theory on this issue are presented (under 4.2.1 from the aspect of the division of powers, under 4.2.2 from the aspect of Grundrechtsdogmatik); in Section 5 the question of the capability of the legislator to interpret the constitution is discussed – with the answer that it must be capable to do it, because the constitutional interpretation, conscious or unconscious, is inherent to any legislation.