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A problem for the unambitious view of legal normativity
O AVTORJU
Associate professor of Law at the School of Law, University of Leicester (UK), and DFG Research Fellow at the Institute of Philosophy, Goethe University Frankfurt (Germany)
AVTOR
Stefano Bertea
SOAVTOR
TIP DOKUMENTA
Strokovni članki
KLJUČNE BESEDE
KEYWORDS
legal positivism, normativity, law, morality, Hart (HLA), Kelsen (Hans)
NASLOV SEKCIJE
Discussion with Brian H. Bix
SECTION
Revusov forum
PUBLIKACIJA
Revija Revus
ŠTEVILKA PUBLIKACIJE ABS
37
LETO
2019
ZALOŽNIK
Klub Revus - Center za raziskovanje evropske Ustavnosti in demokracije
POVZETEK
SUMMARY
In this contribution, I discuss the so-called “unambitious view of legal normativity”, as it is specifically theorised by Brian Bix. While I agree with Bix that legal normativity should not be assumed to be reducible by default to moral normativity, I will argue that the normativity of law cannot be qualified as a sui generis form of normativity, for, pace Bix, the quality of legal normativity is best understood as genuine. That is, the normative claims the law makes on its subjects do address the general practical question: What ought we to do?
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