TFL Vsebine / Revija Revus

S obzirom na svoj metodološki pristup teorija prava uobičajeno se dijeli na deskriptivnu, navodno nevrednujuću, i normativnu, tj. vrednujuću i opravdavajuću teoriju pravu. U svojoj knjizi Evaluation and Legal Theory Julie Dickson takvu dihotomiju odbacuje. Tvrdi da je čitava teorija prava na ovaj ili onaj način vrednujuća. Zato uvodi dihotomiju između posredno vrednujuće i neposredno vrednujuće teorije prava. Dok je zadatak neposredno vrednujuće teorije prava pravo vrednovati moralno, posredno vrednujuća teorija prava donosi vrednujuće sudove o tome koja je obilježja prava najvažnije i najznačajnije objasniti. U ovome radu prvo izlažem Dicksoničin prikaz “vrednujućeg-ali-ne-moralno-vrednujućeg” shvaćanja teorije prava te potom taj prikaz podvrgavam kritici. Naposljetku iznosim neke primjedbe glede korisnosti Dicksoničine dihotomije između neposredno i posredno vrednujuće teorije prava. | Za englesku verziju ovog članka vidi Luka Burazin, Indirectly and Directly Evaluative Legal Theory. A Reply to Julie Dickson, Diritto & questioni pubbliche (2012) 12, pp. 183–210.

Owing to its methodological approach legal theory is usually divided into descriptive, presumably non-evaluative, and normative, i.e. evaluative and justificatory, legal theory. In her Evaluation and Legal Theory Julie Dickson rejects this dichotomy. She argues that all legal theory is evaluative in one way or another. Therefore, she introduces a dichotomy between indirectly evaluative and directly evaluative legal theory. Whereas directly evaluative legal theory has the task of evaluating law morally, indirectly evaluative legal theory makes evaluative judgements as to what features of law are most important and significant to explain. In my paper I first set out Dickson’s account of the ‘evaluative-but-not-morally-evaluative’ view of legal theory and then critically examine this account. Finally, I make some remarks concerning the fruitfulness of Dickson’s dichotomy between indirectly and directly evaluative legal theory. | For the English version of this paper see Luka Burazin, Indirectly and Directly Evaluative Legal Theory. A Reply to Julie Dickson, Diritto & questioni pubbliche (2012) 12, pp. 183–210.