TFL Vsebine / Revija Javna uprava

Članek identificira možnost dostopa do oz. zagotavljanje kvalitetnih informacij za odločanje igralcev na trgih dela in šolstva kot temeljni predpogoj za zagotovitev možnosti za njihovo racionalno odločanje ter, posledično, za oblikovanje tekmovalnega, konkurenčnega okolja na obeh trgih. Na podlagi analize aktualne ureditve zagotavljanja informacij za odločanje oz. obstoječega sistema zagotavljanja kvalitete v visokem šolstvu izpostavlja dejstvo, da ne samo, da pri nas nihče (sistematično) ne spremlja ključnih podatkov, ki bi bili potrebni za produkcijo kvalitetnih informacij, država z dajanjem videza, da zagotavlja kvaliteto, poleg pošiljanja zavajajočih signalov igralcem na trgu, z licenciranjem visokošolskih programov še posebej (neutemeljeno) omejuje svobodo delovanja ponudnikov na trgu šolstva. Za prihodnje zmanjšanje transakcijskih stroškov povezovanja trga dela s trgom šolstva, ki zagotovo predstavlja temeljni »izvir« številnih aktualnih problemov na obravnavanem področju, bi bilo v prihodnje s pravno-ekonomskega vidika bolj (od obstoječega centralnoplanskega pristopa) primerno prepustiti določanje kvalitete diplom tržnemu mehanizmu, ter obenem zagotoviti ustrezno podporo za njegovo učinkovito delovanje v obliki vzpostavitve sistematičnega zbiranja in objavljanja ključnih podatkov o donosnosti investicije v konkretne programe posameznih šol.

This paper identifies the access to/provision of quality information to player on labor market and market for (higher) education as essential for their rational decision-making as well as, consequentially, for ensuring competitive conditions on both markets. On basis of economic analysis of current legislation, governing the production of information for decision-making as well as the monitoring of quality of faculties, it is shown that in Slovenia, there is no (systematic) monitoring of key variables, necessary for the production of quality information. Moreover, the State has also been, by giving the appearance, that it monitors the quality through ex ante licensing of educational programs, not only sending the players false signals, but also limiting, without any sound legal ground, economic freedom of providers of educational programs. In order to reduce the transaction costs of connecting the labor market with the market for (higher) education, which most definitely represents the major source of current (numerous) issues in the field, it is of great importance that in the future, the »central-planning approach of securing the quality of higher education« will be abandoned – in favor of the market mechanism: in order to enable its efficient functioning, however, it is necessary to establish an adequate system of collecting as well as publishing key data on returns on investment in tertiary education.