TFL Vsebine / Revija Pravnik

9

Državni svet, drugi dom slovenskega parlamenta, je nastal kot kompromis različnih idej ob nastanku slovenske ustave. Članek predstavlja razvoj ideje dvodomnega parlamentarnega sistema od poznih osemdesetih let dvajsetega stoletja do začetka devetdesetih let, ko se je ta ideja prek osnutka in predloga ustave uresničila v veljavni ustavi. Sprejet kompromis je vplival na podnormirano ureditev Državnega sveta, ki predstavlja številne težave v praksi. V članku so predstavljene možnosti sprememb ustavne ureditve Državnega sveta, ki jih je skoraj toliko, kolikor je njihovih avtorjev. Spremembe gredo v več smeri, od ukinitve na eni strani do preoblikovanja in spremembe veljavne ureditve Državnega sveta na drugi strani. V nadaljevanju članka je predstavljena ena od preprostejših sprememb, in sicer sprememba ureditve postopka ponovnega odločanja o zakonu, ki bi omogočila dvig kakovosti sprejete zakonodaje. S spremembo je predlagano, da se namesto ponovnega glasovanja o zakonu, ki je nesmiselno podaljševanje zakonodajnega postopka, de lege ferenda omogoči razpravo o spornih členih zakona ter odločanje o morebitnih spremembah spornega dela zakona, kar bi navsezadnje pripomoglo k odpravi nepotrebnih nadaljnjih postopkih noveliranja zakonov.

The National Council, Slovenia’s second parliamentary chamber, was created as a compromise of different ideas during the formation of the Slovenian Constitution. This article traces the evolution of the idea of a bicameral parliamentary system from the late 1980s of the 20th century to the beginning of the 1990s when this idea was embedded in the current Constitution through the draft and proposal of the Constitution. The compromise reached during the drafting of the Constitution affected the law regulatory arrangement of the National Council, leading to numerous practical challenges. The aim of this article is to explore the spectrum of potential amendments to the constitutional regulation of the National Council in several directions, spanning from abolition to transformation and modification of the existing regulation of the National Council. In the remaining part of the article, a change to the regulation of the procedure for reconsidering the law is presented with the aim to bolster the quality of the adopted legislation. As a solution, it is proposed that, instead of voting on the law again, which represents a pointless prolongation of the legislative procedure, the arrangement de lege ferenda enables a discussion of the disputed provisions of the law and a decision on possible changes to the disputed part of the law, thereby obviating unnecessary further procedures for amending the law.

Changes to the Constitutional Arrangement of the National Council