TFL Vsebine / Revija Pravnik

5

Prispevek obravnava problem iskanja ustreznega razmerja med enotnostjo in raznolikostjo v večnivojskih ustavnih sistemih. Predlagan je pristop vzporedne obravnave dveh teoretičnih pristopov: diferenciacije v pravu EU ter asimetričnega federalizma. Kljub poudarjenemu pomenu enotnosti in učinkovitosti pravnega reda EU je diferenciacija stalen spremljevalec razvoja evropske integracije. Z različnimi mehanizmi diferenciacije se je EU spopadala z naraščajočo raznolikostjo med državami članicami. Na podoben način (kvazi) federalni sistemi raznolikost upravljajo z uvajanjem različnih oblik asimetrij, proučevanih v okviru teorije asimetričnega federalizma. Prispevek pokaže, da med diferenciacijo v pravu EU ter asimetrijami v (kvazi)federalnih sistemih obstaja pomembno prekrivanje v zvezi z njunimi vzroki, razlagami, rezultati in normativnimi temelji. Preučevanje večnivojskih ustavnih sistemov s sočasno uporabo diferenciacije in asimetričnega federalizma pripomore k lažjemu doseganju pojasnjevalnih, analitičnih in normativnih ciljev. Prispevek se osredotoča predvsem na pomen uporabe asimetrij v EU in gre tako za inovativen pristop k reševanju problema raznolikosti v večnivojskih ustavnih sistemih.

This paper addresses the challenge of achieving an appropriate balance between unity and diversity within multilevel constitutional systems. It proposes a parallel examination of two theoretical frameworks: differentiation in EU law and asymmetric federalism. Although the principles of unity and effectiveness are central to the EU legal order, differentiation has consistently featured in the evolution of European integration. Through various mechanisms of differentiation, the EU has managed the increasing diversity among its Member States. Similarly, (quasi-)federal systems tackle this issue by introducing various forms of asymmetries, which are analysed within the framework of the theory of asymmetric federalism. The paper demonstrates significant overlap between differentiation in EU law and asymmetries in (quasi-)federal systems in terms of their causes, explanations, outcomes, and normative foundations. Investigating multilevel constitutional systems through the simultaneous use of differentiation and asymmetric federalism facilitates the achievement of explanatory, analytical, and normative objectives. Specifically, this paper focuses on the relevance of employing asymmetries in the EU, thereby presenting an innovative approach to addressing the challenge of diversity in multilevel systems.

Differentiation in EU Law and Asymmetric Federalism: Two Sides of the Same Coin?