TFL Vsebine / Revija Revus

Avtor oriše eno od oblik analitičnega pravnega realizma kor priredje treh osnovnih tez. Po prvi tezi so razlagalne izjave v pravnem govoru pripisovalne izjave brez spoznavne vloge. Po drugi tezi je pravo skupek vplivnih norm, tj. tistih norm, ki so bile dejansko uporabljene (pri razreševanju zadev) v preteklosti in jih bodo v prihodnosti verjetno uporabila pristojna telesa. Po tretji tezi se pravne znanosti kot spoznavne dejavnosti ne sme zamenjevati s pravno stroko. Čeprav se pravna stroka udejstvuje tudi v spoznavnih dejavnostih, njeno delo sestavljajo predvsem nespoznavne dejavnosti, kakršni sta pravno razlaganje in pravotvorje. | Starejša različica tega članka je bila objavljena v Revusu (2013) 19 v italijanščini, francoščini in hrvaščini.

The author outlines one form of analytical legal realism as the junction of three main theses. According to its first main thesis, interpretive sentences in legal discourse are ascriptive sentences with no cognitive function. According to the second thesis, the law is the set of norms in force, i.e. the norms actually applied (that is, used in deciding cases) in the past and predictably applied in the future by law-applying agencies. The third thesis is that legal science as a cognitive activity must not be confused with legal scholarship. Although legal scholars do engage in cognitive activities, their work mainly consists in non-cognitive activities such as interpretation and legal construction. | An earlier version of this statement was published in Revus (2013) 19 in Italian, French, and Croatian.