TFL Vsebine / Revija Revus

Pred-konvencije. V tem zapisu avtor trdi, da obstajajo konvencije posebne vrste, ki niso niti norme niti ponavljajoča se ravnanja, temveč delijo značilnosti obeh. Potem ko površno analizira pomen pojma 'kovencija', poda avtor nekaj primerov vrste pojava, ki ga ima v mislih: telesne sposobnosti, know-how, okus in stil, habitus (P. Bourdieu), »discipline« (M. Foucault). Avtor nato zbere nekaj argumentov v prid svoji trditvi: (i) razmisleke o identitetnih pogojih precedensov (D. Lewis) in o možnosti projeciranja predikatov ter induktivnem sklepanju na splošno (N. Goodman); (ii) misli o upoštevanju pravil (L. Wittgenstein); (iii) pregled Searlovih idej o »Ozadju« intencionalnosti. Zaključi z nekaj komentarji na temo častitljivega nasprotja med 'naravo' in 'konvencijo'.  Italijanski original članka je bil objavljen v: Ragion Pratica (2014) 2: 605-632.

In this paper I argue that there exist conventions of a peculiar sort which are neither norms nor regularities of behaviour, partaking of both. I proceed as follows. After a brief analysis of the meaning of ‘convention’, I give some examples of the kind of phenomena I have in mind: bodily skills, know-how, taste and style, habitus (P. Bourdieu), “disciplines” (M. Foucault). Then I group some arguments supporting my claim: (i) considerations about the identity conditions of precedents (D. Lewis) and about the projectibility of predicates in inductive inference generally (N. Goodman); (ii) thoughts about rule-following (L. Wittgenstein); (iii) an examination of some of J. R. Searle’s ideas about the “Background” of intentionality. I conclude with some remarks about the time-honoured antithesis ‘nature’ v. ‘convention’.  The Italian original of this text was published in: Ragion Pratica (2014) 2: 605–632.