TFL Vsebine / Revija Revus

Razlika med normami in ubeseditvami norm zavezuje pravoslovce k obravnavanju pravnih norm kot danosti. Avtorica najprej osvetli pot, ki so jo tlakovali nekateri analitični filozofi jezika in ki vodi od pomena do danosti. Nato predstavi sklop problemov, ki nastanejo zaradi obravnavanja norm kot danosti. Ne glede na to, s katero vrsto danosti imamo opraviti, moramo razlikovati med merili prepoznave (ali identifikacije) in primeri poposameznjenja (ali individuacije) tovrstnih danosti. V predstavljenem primeru abstraktnih danosti pa to razlikovanje pade. S tem, da avtorica zamenja pojma pomenske vsebine (ali intenzije) in pomenskega obsega (oz. ekstenzije) besed za vsebinski in obsežnostni vidik tega, o čemer govorimo, očrta tudi predlog metodološkega načrta za pravo in pravno teorijo.

The distinction between norms and norm-formulations commits legal theorists to treat legal norms as entities. In this article I first explore the path from meaning to entities built by some analytical philosophers of language. Later, I present a set of problems produced by treating norms as entities. Whatever type of entities we deal with calls for a clear differentiation between identification and individuation criteria of such entities. In the putative case of abstract entities the differentiation collapses. Through changing the notions of the intension and extension of words by extensional and intensional aspects of what we talk about, I outline a methodological programme for Law and Legal Theory. That programme is based in the identification of normativity.