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Revus - številka 35, letnik 2018

Revus

Revus je prva revija za ustavno teorijo in filozofijo prava na Zahodnem Balkanu. Z večjezičnostjo se ponuja tudi kot edini regionalni pravni forum. Strogi izbirni postopek in mednarodna indeksiranost vsebine pa zagotavljata kakovost in odmevnost v njej objavljenih razprav in člankov.

Strokovna revija
Andrej Kristan
Luka Burazin
Matija Žgur
Klub Revus - Center za raziskovanje evropske Ustavnosti in demokracije
Lawrence Alexander (San Diego), Robert Alexy (Kiel), Manuel Atienza (Alicante), Lidija Basta Fleiner (Beograd), Petar Bojanić (Beograd), Bartosz Brożek (Krakow), Eugenio Bulygin (Buenos Aires), Pierluigi Chiassoni (Genova), Timothy Endicott (Oxford), Riccardo Guastini (Genova), Kenneth Himma (Seattle), Eric Millard (Paris), François Ost (Bruxelles), Ivan Padjen (Rijeka), Marijan Pavčnik (Ljubljana), Ciril Ribičič (Ljubljana), Branko Smerdel (Zagreb), Andraž Teršek (Koper), Michel Troper (Paris), Jan Woleński (Krakow), Boštjan M. Zupančič (Ljubljana)
Matej Avbelj, Bojan Bugarič, Karine Caunes, Bruno Celano, Paolo Comanducci, Luís Duarte d'Almeida, Franc Grad, Stefan Haussler, Giulio Itzcovich, András Jakab, Rajko Knez, Arne Mavčič, Marko Milanović, Luka Omladić, Dennis Patterson, Giorgio Pino, Francesca Poggi, Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco, Juan Ruiz Manero, Vasilka Sancin, Dale Smith, Maja Smrkolj, Vojko Strahovnik, Antal Szerletics, Katja Šugman Stubbs, Dominika Švarc, Massimiliano Vignolo

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Brezplačna registracija
María Beatriz Arriagada Cáceres

María Beatriz Arriagada Cáceres

Fundamentality, interdefinability, and circularity

Fundamentality, interdefinibility and circularity. Three thesis on Hohfeld under discussion. According to the way in which it has been generally understood, the Hohfeldian analysis of subjective legal positions is compromised with three theses involved: (i) all Hohfeldian concepts are fundamental, (ii) none of these concepts can be defined without reference to its relation to another concept of the same scheme and (iii) Hohfeld's analysis is circular. The aim of this paper is to discuss these theses, which may be dubbed as: (i) thesis of fundamentality, (ii) thesis of interdefinibility and (iii) thesis of circularity. The author tries to show that, although from a logical point of view, these three theses are true, they presuppose a set of premises that Hohfeld does not make explicit: (a) right, duty, privilege and no-right are first order positions while power, liability, immunity and disability are second order positions; (b) duty, privilege, power and disability are active positions while right, no-right, liability and immunity are passive positions; and (c) privilege, no-right, disability and inmunity are, as opposed to those of duty, right, power and liability, purely negative positions in the sense that they lack conceptual autonomy. The author argues that the analysis of these implicit premises allows to notice that Hohfeld assumes a point of view that transcends the strictly logical one by placing the focus on the practical utility of the Hohfeldian concepts and that, from this point of view, the three theses under discussion (i, ii and iii) are false.

Riccardo Guastini

Riccardo Guastini

Two conceptions of norms

The author analyses the distinction between the hyletic and the expressive conception of norms. His main goal is to reject Alchourrón and Bulygin's thesis that these conceptions offer two incompatible solutions to one single problem. He argues that these conceptions deal with two different and partially independent issues. One issue regards the “genesis of norms”, that is, the process of their production. The other issue regards the “nature of norms” and, therefore, the product of that process. The author concludes that these conceptions aren’t necessarily incompatible, even though one’s proposed solution to one of the problems somehow conditions her response to the other problem.

Giovanni Battista Ratti

Giovanni Battista Ratti

Incompatibility and entailment in the logic of norms

In this paper I examine critically some theses on the incompatibility and the implication between norms that appear in a well-known article by Bulygin on the conceptions of the logic of norms elaborated, respectively, by Weinberger and Kelsen. I also analyze Bulygin’s thesis according to which the expressive conception of norms, defended by Kelsen in the last part of his career, is perfectly capable of explaining the relationship of justification that mediates between general norms and particular norms (especially, between legislated norms and judicial decisions) and, being capable of this, cannot be accused of “irrationalism”, as Weinberger argues instead. This work is concluded by formulating a dilemma that Bulygin should face: either the notion of the satisfaction of norms is accepted and the “rationalism” of the expressive conception is saved, or this notion is rejected and with it also the possibility of “expressive” rationality in legal reasoning. | A prior version of this text was presented on 28 July 2015, at the Special Workshop “Bulygin’s Philosophy of Law”, XXVII IVR Congress, Washington, DC (USA).

Julieta A. Rábanos

Julieta A. Rábanos

El filósofo, el legislador, y el sistema

The philosopher, the legislator, and the system. Brief notes on Eugenio Bulygin’s (lack of) position about the legislator and its role in legal systems. The aim of the present paper is to suggest that the central issues related to the legislator have not been dealt in depth by Bulygin in his prolific work, leading to some internal inconsistences in his thinking. I specifically aim to suggest that: i) the ideal of legal system defended in Normative Systems (on which all his later work is based upon) seems to be based on the ideal of rational legislator; ii) the analysis on normative gaps is for Bulygin dependent on the existence of a cut in the legal system, but it is never clear if this cut is made by the interpreter or the legislator; and iii) the immense relevance given to the existence of an axiomatic basis creates the need to take position about who really creates it, if the interpreter or the legislator; position that has not been clearly taken by Bulygin.

Hans Kelsen

Hans Kelsen

Zakaj je treba spoštovati pravo?

Ta prispevek obravnava vprašanje zavezujoče moči pravnega reda. Avtor ob tem opozori, da več različnih teorij (naravnopravna doktrina, teološka doktrina in pozitivnopravna znanost) veljavnost normativnega reda upravičuje na isti način, in sicer s predpostavko temeljne norme. V zaključku avtor nato opiše še enotnost državnih pravnih redov in mednarodnega prava, katerih skupni razlog za veljavnost prepozna v temeljni normi, ki običajno ravnanje držav vzpostavlja kot pravodajno dejstvo. | To besedilo je prevod angleškega izvirnika Why should the law be obeyed?, ki je bil objavljen v avtorjevi knjigi What is justice? Justice, law, and politics in the mirror of science (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1957).

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