TFL Vsebine / Revija Revus

Avtorica v prispevku analizira razvoj mirande v ZDA od leta 1966 do danes in primerja današnjo ameriško mirando s slovensko. V prispevku zagovarja stališče, da je bistvena razlika med njima v tem, da ima slovenski kazenski postopek dve mirandi, ameriški pa eno. Ameriška miranda se namreč uporablja, ko je osumljencu od vzeta prostost in je ob tem zaslišan, medtem ko se slovenska miranda uporablja, ko je osumljencu odvzeta prostost ali ko je zaslišan s strani policije, ob tem da je miranda ob odvzemu prostosti ustavna pravica, miranda ob zaslišanju pa ne vedno. Avtorica z analizo odločb Vrhovnega sodišča ZDA pri kaže, da se je ameriška miranda v zadnjih letih zelo približala kontinentalnemu kazenskemu postopku, predvsem v smislu spreminjanja mirande v luči iskanja materialne resnice. Vrhovno sodišče ZDA je namreč s svojimi odločitvami uvedlo številne izjeme od originalne Mirande, ki so v lanskem letu pripeljale do tega, da se lahko na sojenju zoper obdolženca uporabi fizični dokaz, ki je bil pridobljen s kršenjem mirande. Avtorica je mnenja, da je takšna miranda zelo podobna slovenski mirandi v pred kazenskem postopku, ki dopušča policijsko zaslišanje osumljenca brez prisotnosti zagovornika, na podlagi katerega policija sicer res napravi »le« uradni zaznamek, vendar pa lahko policija na podlagi takega uradnega zaznamka zakonito zbira dokaze, hkrati pa se s takim za znamkom lahko seznani tudi sodnik, ki odloča o glavni stvari. Avtorica v razpravi opozori na pomembno dejstvo, da se slovenska in ameriška ureditev v svojih ustavnih določbah bistveno razlikujeta. Ustava ZDA namreč nima izrecnih določb o pravici do molka ali pravici do zagovornika ob odvzemu prostosti in policijskem zaslišanju, za to je miranda le eden iz med načinov varovanja privilegija zoper samoobtožbo. Miranda tako ni ustavno zavarovana pravica, njeno kršenje pa samo po sebi še ne predstavlja upravičenega razloga za izločitev tako pridobljenih dokazov. Ustava RS ima na drugi strani izrecno določbo o pravici do molka in pravici do zagovornika ob odvzemu prostosti, zato slovenska miranda ob odvzemu prostosti ni le način varovanja privilegija zoper samoobtožbo, tem več ustavna pravica. Prav zato ureditev policijske ga zaslišanja v pred kazenskem postopku v primerih, ko je to povezano z odvzemom prostosti in ko osumljencu obenem ni zagotovljena pomoč zagovornika, ni skladna z Ustavo RS. V takih primerih se na podlagi uradnega zaznamka ne bi smelo pridobivati drugih dokazov oziroma bi morali biti ta ki dokazi izločeni, prav tako pa bi moral bi ti izločen uradni za znamek, saj gre za neposredno kršitev ustavne določbe o pravici do zagovornika.

The author analyzes and discusses the development of the American Miranda from 1966 until today and compares it with the Slovene miranda. She argues that the main difference between them is in the conditions under which Miranda applies and in the constitutional protection each of them is afforded. The American miranda applies when a suspect is taken into custody and she is interrogated, while the Slovene miranda applies if a suspect is either taken into custody or she is interrogated by the police. In the former case miranda is protected by the Slovene Constitution, but not in the latter. Through the analysis of the jurisprudence of the US Supreme Court the author demonstrates that the American regulation of miranda has become very close to what is considered to be the continental approach to the criminal procedure in the last few years, since the US Supreme Court, in the name of finding the material truth at trials has recognized numerous exceptions to miranda. The latest exception to miranda allows for the state at a trial to introduce the physical evidence derived from a statement of the defendant who had not been given the Miranda warnings. The author argues that the American miranda with the applicable exceptions is very similar to the miranda of the Slovene Criminal Procedure Act that allows for the police interrogation without the presence of an attorney, which is evidenced “only” by the official note, which is not regarded as a formal evidence, but on the basis of which the police may lawfully seek other evidence and which the trial judge is free to review. The author emphasizes the difference between the Slovene and the American constitutional provisions related to miranda, especially in the view of the nature of the protection that each provides for the miranda rights. Since the American Constitution has no explicit provisions regarding the right to remain silent and the right to the assistance of an attorney, miranda is only one of the ways to safeguard the privilege against self-incrimination. Therefore, miranda itself is not a constitutional right and a violation of miranda without more does not justify the exclusion of an evidence obtained in the violation of miranda. The Slovene Constitution, on the other hand, has explicit provisions concerning the right to remain silent and the right to the assistance of an attorney in cases where the freedom to move is restricted in a significant way, therefore the Slovenian miranda in cases where the suspect is taken into custody is not only a way of safeguarding the privilege against self-incrimination, but a constitutionally protected right. The author argues that precisely for this reason, the regulation of the police interrogation in cases where a suspect is taken into custody and is not afforded the assistance of an attorney is not in accordance with the provisions of the Slovene Constitution. In cases like that the evidence derived from such official note should be excluded as well as the official note itself, since it was obtained in a way that directly violates the constitutional provisions with respect to the right to the assistance of an attorney.