TFL Vsebine / Revija Pravnik

9

Avtorja nadrobno razčlenjujeta nekatere doslej zastrte razsežnosti biti kaznivega dejanja poslovne goljufije po 228. členu KZ-1 ter tako omogočita avtentičen uvid v protislovno zasnovo te inkriminacije. Odsotnost zahteve po vzročni zvezi med preslepitvijo ali prikrivanjem in prehodom premoženja neizogibno pomeni, da obravnavani delikt v enem segmentu ustreza zatajitvi in ne goljufiji. Iz tega večinoma sledi tudi mešana narava dobrine, ki jo inkriminacija ščiti. Varovanju tujega premoženja namreč ob bok stopi še zaščita zaupnosti predhodno vzpostavljenega poslovnega razmerja. Poleg tega avtorja obravnavata tudi dileme, bolj ali manj povezane s specifično naravo zakonskega znaka premoženjska škoda ter tudi z vprašanjem trenutka njegove realizacije. Pri nekaterih od pravkar navedenih točk se opiramo tudi na zglede iz tujih, zlasti anglosaških pravnih sistemov, ki obravnavane zagate rešujejo povsem drugače. Končno je treba poudariti še, da zlasti nekatere argumentacijske verige, izpričane v tem delu, obelodanijo nekatera nova spoznanja, ki družno s starejšimi postavljajo pod vprašaj sozvočje obravnavane inkriminacije z načelom zakonitosti, natančneje z ustavnim načelom lex certa.

The authors analyse in detail some as of yet shrouded dimensions of the criminal offence of business fraud as incriminated in Article 228 of the Slovenian Criminal Code. Therefore, they enable one to make an authentic view of the contradictory nature of the discussed criminal offence. The absence of the causal nexus between concealment or transfer of certain facts, and a transfer of wealth inevitably means that the discussed criminal offence partly suits the criminal offence of embezzlement, rather than that of fraud. The object which the discussed criminal offence endangers (or harms) is, therefore, besides the wealth of the another, the confidentiality of the business relationship between the parties. The authors also discuss dilemmas that may be derived from the specific understanding of harm inflicted on another’s wealth as an element of the criminal offence of business fraud, and also with questions regarding the moment of its realisation. Sometimes, the authors also seek arguments for their conclusions in examples from Anglo-Saxon legal systems, which are—when compared to ours—completely different. It is finally necessary to emphasise that certain authors’ conclusions, together with some older ones, accordantly question the conformity of the discussed incrimination with the constitutional principle lex certa.

Incrimination of Business Fraud: Redundant or Even Inconsistent with the Lex Certa Principle?