TFL Vsebine / Revija Revus

Skupaj z novim, zmerno skeptičnim naukom o razlaganju v pravu Vittorio Villa oblikuje tudi poseben nauk o pomenu. Na neustreznost tega nauka o pomenu avtor članka opozori z nekaj sodnimi primeri tako imenovanih brezhibnih nesoglasij. V članku ne izpodbija razlogov, ki so Villo privedli do oblikovanja njegovega nauka o razlaganju. Nasprotno, z navezovanjem na sodobno razpravo v filozofiji jezika se s predlogom omeji na zgolj takšen odklon od Villovega nauka, ki lahko pojasni obstoj in predvidi nastanek nesoglasij, ki se porodijo ob spremembah sodne prakse, uspešno pa loči tudi različna pogleda na takšna nesoglasja, ki ju imajo vanje vpleteni sodniki in zunanji opazovalci.

Together with his moderately sceptical theory of legal interpretation Vittorio Villa also proposes a particular theory of meaning. This paper purports to demonstrate the inadequacy of Villa's theory of meaning by giving some judicial examples of the so-called faultless disagreements. The author, however, does not dismiss the motivations that lie behind Villa's project. He presents Villa's standpoint in terms, which are better known in current debates in the philosophy of language, and proposes, in alternative to Villa's original view, a relativist theory of meaning: a theory, that is, which tries to give account for the external point of view of a legal realist as well as of the internal point of view of judges.